

superable difficulties, there is no justification for assuming that it can ever prove adequate to the explanation of the more complex modes of activity. He then shows that many of his objections to the canalisation hypothesis hold good also of the "intracellular" hypothesis, the only alternative yet suggested; and he points out that V. Kries and Semon, the principal advocates of the latter view, have not even attempted to suggest how a material memory trace may be deposited in a nerve-cell, but have merely made some vague appeal to the numerical vastness of the multitude of atoms that may be contained in a single nerve-cell and have appealed to the supposed analogy of the germ-cell; for this is assumed on all mechanistic views of heredity to comprise, in the form of material dispositions in space, the potentialities or determinants of all the innate peculiarities of the adult being. But, as the author rightly points out, to invoke this analogy is to beg the question in dispute, is to justify mechanistic explanation in one sphere by assuming that it is applicable in another of which we are equally ignorant; a mode of reasoning which, though it is common enough, can seem satisfactory only to those whose minds are dogmatically closed to the possibility of explanations of other types. The outcome of this section may be summed up in the author's words—"the more difficult, complicated, and intrinsically improbable, the shape taken by the purely physiological, the at bottom physico-chemical, hypothesis of memory, the more ready should we be to ask, whether we are not on a wholly false track, and whether it were not better to attempt (in the proper sense of the words) a physiologic-psychologic hypothesis of memory" (p. 271).

The concluding section is a very brief critical review of the principal current hypotheses of the psycho-physical relation. The course of the discussion tends strongly in favour of "interactionism"; but the author claims to reconcile "interactionism" with "parallelism" by pointing out (p. 374) that (as the present writer has also remarked) if psycho-physical interaction takes place, then psycho-physical parallelism is also true in a certain very limited sense; because those psychical processes which influence the course of physical processes must in principle be capable of being appreciated by us as phenomena in the same indirect way as energy changes or physical influences (such as magnetic attraction) which do not directly affect our sense organs.

The whole book is very clearly written, and the discussions are conducted with admirable impartiality. It may be strongly recommended to those many physiologists and psychologists who too confidently assume that the course of mental process and of bodily behaviour can in principle be adequately explained in terms of physico-chemical constructions.

W. McD.

*Das Erkenntnisproblem in Hegel's Philosophie. Die Erkenntniskritik als Metaphysik.* By ADOLF PHALÉN. Upsala: E. Berling, 1912. Pp. 458.

Dr. Phalén continues the distinguished line of Scandinavian philosophers who have devoted special attention to Hegel. He is well equipped for the task he has undertaken. His knowledge both of the text of Hegel and of the principal commentators, German, English, and Scandinavian, is obviously very extensive. His contention in this book may be summed up in his own statement: "Hegel's Hauptproblem das erkenntnistheoretische ist" (p. 215); and again "Das Erkenntnisproblem bei Hegel . . . bedeutet nicht ein Verlassen des transzendental-philosophischen oder des kritischen Standpunktes Kants, sondern ist eine folgerichtige Entwicklung desselben" (p. 292).

The view thus expressed is very new, for few propositions have been more generally accepted about Hegel than that his object was to reach ontological conclusions. Has Dr. Phalén succeeded in establishing his position? It does not seem to me that he has done so. He has, no doubt, succeeded in showing that certain stages in Hegel's arguments cannot be held to correspond entirely to anything in the nature of the reality contemplated, and can only be made intelligible if we take into account the mind which contemplates the reality, and, in its contemplation, gradually passes from partial error to truth. This seems to me an important characteristic of Hegel's system, not sufficiently emphasised by himself, and ignored by many students of his philosophy, and Dr. Phalén has done valuable service in calling attention to it. But it does not prove his point. An argument which cannot be understood except in reference to a knowing subject may yet give information which is not epistemological but ontological. For example, we may reach ontological conclusions by means of a *reductio ad absurdum*, although a *reductio ad absurdum* involves the introduction of an hypothesis to which nothing corresponds in the nature of the reality. In the same way, Hegel's arguments, though they deal not only with the reality but with the source of our thought about it, may yet lead to conclusions absolutely true of the reality. And this, I believe, is what Hegel considered he had accomplished.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

*Leitfaden der Experimentellen Psychopathologie.* Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität Leipzig, von Privatdozent Dr. ADALBERT GREGOR, Oberarzt der psychiatrisch-neurologischen Klinik, Leipzig. Berlin, 1910, 8vo. Pp x, 222.

An apology is due from the reviewer for his long delay in bringing this capital book to the notice of readers of *MIND*. It consists of sixteen lectures on the application of experimental psychological methods in the study of mental pathology. In the introductory lecture Dr. Gregor emphasises the importance of psychology to the psychiatrist, and discusses the possibilities and limits of the use of experimental methods, and the bearing of their use upon problems of clinical treatment. He then treats successively of experiments on "time-sense," reactions, apprehension, association, memory, evidence, attention, voluntary movement, bodily expression of affective states, mental work, and tests of intelligence. His plan in each case is to explain first the nature and technique of the experiments on normal persons, then to discuss their applicability, and alterations that may be necessary when the patients are abnormal, and lastly to give a summary of results obtained by himself and other experimentalists. Dr. Gregor is well known for his work on cases of Korsakow's disease, and he draws upon it for the particularly interesting lectures on memory and on attention. The book is clearly and methodically written, but as published it suffers grievously from absence of an index and of titles to the chapters. The table of contents is the reader's only assistance, and it has no references to the pages of the text. The reader who is undaunted by these difficulties will be rewarded.

T. L.

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Received also:—

John Watson, *The Interpretation of Religious Experiences*, The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1910-12, vol. i., Historical, pp. xiv, 376; vol. ii., Constructive, pp. x, 342, Glasgow, Maclehose, 1912.